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The current debate over Heidegger's Nazism began with the appearance 
of Victor Farias' Heidegger et le nazisme in I987. 1 Despite occasional 
polemical excesses, Farias succeeded in revealing the depth of Heidegger's 
commitment to National Socialism and the disingenuousness of his later 
attempt to account for his actions after his resignation from the rectorship of 
the University of Freiburg in 1934. 2 Heidegger's active support of the 
National Socialist regime was not, as he later claimed, restricted to the 
period of his term as rector. After his resignation from the rectorship, 
Heidegger continued his collaboration with the regime by secretly 
denouncing colleagues and students. 3 He remained a dues paying member 
of the Nazi party until the end of the war and in 1953 published a modified 
version of a lecture originally delivered in 1933 entitled An Introduction to 
Metaphysics which retained the notorious remark about the "inner truth and 
greatness" of the Nazi movement. 4 
Despite more even-handed treatments of the issue of Heidegger's 
Nazism 5 , Farias polemics set the tone for the partisan debate that ensued. 
Critics of Heidegger seized the opportunity to dismiss his philosophy 
because of its purpotedly intrinsic link to Nazism. 6 Supporters of 
I Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme, trans. Myriam Benarroch and Jean-Baptiste 
Grasset (Lagrasse, France: Editions Verdier, 1987). This work appears in English 
as Heidegger and Nazism, trans. Paul Burrell with Dominic DiBcrnardi 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 
2Cf. '"Only a God Can Save Us': Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger 
(1966)," in The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), 101: "After I stepped down as rector I limited 
myself to teaching. In the summer semester of 1934 I lectured on 'Logic' In the 
following semester I gave the first Hölderlin lecture. In 1936,1 began the Nietzsche 
lectures. Anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a confrontation with 
National Socialism." 
3Fariäs, Heidegger and Nazism, 209-212. 
4Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New 
Haven: Yale University, 1987), 199. 
5 See, e.g., Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie 
(Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1988). See also, Thomas Shechan, 
"Heidegger and the Nazis," New York Review of Books 35, no. 10 (June 16, 1988), 
38-47. 
6Heidegger himself confirmed such a connection in a conversation with Karl Löwith 
in 1936. See Löwith, "My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936," in Wolin, 
The Heidegger Controversy, 142. After remarking that he believed that Heidegger's 
commitment to Nazism was essentially connected to his philosophy, Löwilch notes 
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Heidegger generally sought to separate Heidegger the Nazi from Heidegger 
the philosopher. Whatever Heidegger's degree of involvement with the 
Nazis, they maintained, it is not relevant to Heidegger's project of rethinking 
the meaning of Being. 7 
Unfortunately, the combatants' narrow focus on the minutiae of 
Heidegger's political debacle obscured a number of crucial issues. The 
debate neglected to consider whether Heidegger's Nazism represented not 
merely the moral and intellectual failure of a particular individual, but 
perhaps also the failure of an entire generation of German philosophers. By 
focusing on Heidegger to the exclusion of all else, the substantive historical 
issue of the roles played by other philosophers within the Third Reich was 
overlooked. Perhaps more importantly, the deeper philosophical issues 
concerning the relationship of philosophy and politics that are raised by the 
complicity of German philosophers with the Third Reich were left 
untouched. 
Hans Sluga's Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi 
Germany represents a thoughtful and determined effort to rise above the 
partisan debate and address the broader philosophical and historical issues 
raised by Heidegger's Naxism. Sluga situates Heidegger's Nazism within 
the context of 19th and 20th century German intellectual history. His thesis 
is that Heidegger's political crisis in 1933 was not simply the crisis of a 
particular philosopher, but rather the crisis of an age. 8 If true, Sluga's thesis 
has numerous implications for our understanding of Heidegger's Nazism. 
First, if Heidegger's personal political crisis were a reflection of a more 
widespread spiritual crisis within Germany, then the issue of Heidegger's 
personal responsibility would have to be re-examined. Second, Sluga's 
thesis would effectively undermine any attempt to draw a direct link 
between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism by showing that many other 
philosophers, including some who were philosophically at odds with 
Heidegger, also aligned themselves with the Nazi movement. Finally, 
Sluga's thesis would also imply that most indictments (and most defenses) 
of Heidegger are misguided. By ignoring the larger historical context of 
Heidegger's crisis they exaggerate Heidegger's role and overlook issues of 
greater philosophical significance.9 
that Heidegger "agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of 
'historicity' was the basis of his political 'engagement.' He also left no doubt 
concerning his belief in Hitler." 
7Thomas Sheehan, "A Normal Nazi," New York Review of Books (January 14, 
1993), 30: "Strategics for coping with this new and damning information ranged 
from partial disclaimers . . . to exculpatory incantations . . . to triage: 'Admit the 
Nazism, but save the philosophy!'" 
8Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 246. 
9lbid., IS4-S: "Against the background of history effaced, the significance of 
Heidegger's actions and words looms larger than it actually was. Uninformed 
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Central to Sluga's argument is his reconstruction of the philosophical 
context of Heidegger's crisis in 1933. The date is significant because it 
marks not only the beginning of Hitler's chancellorship, but also the 
beginning of Heidegger's rectorship. Sluga adopts a Foucauldian 
interpretive strategy to demonstrate the continuity between these two 
events. German philosophy and politics in 1933 share a common discursive 
framework, he argues, that forms the historical a priori of the a g e . 1 0 On 
Sluga's view, the discursive framework of Germany in 1933 was composed 
of four ideas: crisis, nation, leadership, and order. Collectively, these ideas 
comprised the basis of the "symbolic environment" that determined both 
philosophical thinking in Germany in the years leading up to 1933, as well 
as the political engagement of philosophers. 1 1 Consequently, the decision 
to become politically active on the part of so many German philosophers in 
1933 "was not simply the result of individual decisions," but was also the 
result of the presuppositions implicit in their intellectual environment. 1 2 
Although the Nazi's manipulated and exploited the symbolic 
environment, they did not create it. Sluga traces the themes of crisis, nation, 
leadership, and order to their origins in the writings of Fichte und Nietzsche. 
Fichte's appeal to the Nazis lay in his nationally oriented socialism, his 
recognition of the present moment as historically decisive, and his political 
involvement in the name of philosophy. Writing during the turmoil of the 
Franco-Prussian War, Fichte's Speeches to the German Nation indicate a 
crisis of German national identity. The crisis of identity demanded a 
renewal of the German nation through leadership that was capable of 
understanding the true political order . 1 3 According to Sluga, Fichte became 
hindsight makes Heidegger a singular figure and suggests a direct link between his 
thought and Nazi ideology." 
lOsiuga's Foucauldian interpretive strategy is designed to avoid reductionistic 
interpretations of Heidegger' Nazism. He wants to avoid a Marxist interpretation 
that would reduce the philosophical realm to an epiphenomcnon of the political. An 
example of such an interpretation can be found in Monika Leska, Philosophen im 
'Dritten Reich': Studie zu Hochschule-und Philosophiebetrieb im fascistisheen 
Duetschland (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1990). Leska maintains that beneath the 
apparent differences among the various philosophical schools in Germany in 1933 
was a common imperialistic, bourgeois foundation that was consonant with fascist 
ideology. Conversely, Sluga also wants to avoid interpretations that reduce the 
political field to the philosophical field, e.g., Pierre Bourdicu, The Political Ontology 
of Martin Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). For his 
discussion of these interpretive issues see Sluga, 246-248. 
"Ibid., 67: "It determined their philosophical thinking as well as their political 
involvement." 
•2lbid. 
l 3Ibid., 40: "Fichte's Addresses, in sum, rested squarely on the belief that a point of 
crisis had been reached in German history-a crisis that was at once political and 
philosophical, a crisis that concerned in particular the German people and the 
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the rallying point for conservative philosophers between the First and the 
Second World Wars who saw him as the spiritual ancestor of their own 
nationalistic concerns. 
In opposition to these reform-minded conservatives was a group that 
Sluga refers to as the "philosophical radicals." This group of philosophical 
radicals, which included Heidegger, identified more closely with Nietzsche 
than with Fichte and German idealism. Nietzsche's appeal resided primarily 
in his purported social Darwinism, in his affirmation of the body, struggle, 
strong leadership, and in his critiques of liberalism and Christianity. 
Nietzsche radicalized the idea of crisis, transformed it from a German to a 
European phenomenon, and called for the revaluation of all values in the 
face of nihilism and the death of G o d . 1 4 
The idea of crisis is the first component in Sluga's reconstruction of the 
historical a priori of 1933. The modern German sense of crisis originated 
with the loss of World War I and increased with the instability of the 
Weimar Republic. Spengler's Decline of the West crystallized the sense of 
crisis and provides Germans of all cultural levels with the language of crisis. 
In politics and philosophy the idea of crisis was linked to the idea of 
revolution. Nazism never abandoned its self-consciously revolutionary 
character and never relinquished the idea of crisis "as a basic element of its 
ideology." 1 5 Thus the appeal of Nazi ideology to so many philosophers 
who had incorporated the concept of crisis into their own philosophizing via 
the nation of intellectual revolution. 
Sluga argues that the framework of crisis is problematic because it 
creates an environment in which too much emphasis is placed on decision 
and action. Sluga sees the notion of great crisis as a destructive habit of 
modern thought; historical developments cannot be adequately understood 
on the model of radical discontinuity of the present and the past. Historical 
crises, when they do occur, arc not sudden transformations brought about by 
heroic acts of will. More often they are the results of the accumulation of 
incremental and almost imperceptible actions and decisions. Therefore, 
Sluga concludes, one lesson we can draw from the political actions of 
philosophers in the Third Reich is that we must abandon the political 
discourse of crisis: 
What is needed is that those in politics think not in terms 
of revolution and crisis, grand decisions and sudden 
transformations, but in terms of patient explorations and 
continuous partial shifts . 1 6 
understanding they had of themselves, a crisis of leadership calling for the 
rccstablishmenl of a true order." 
•4Ibid., 42-49. 
>5lbid., 56. 
I6|bid., 74. 
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Sluga comes to equally negative conclusions about the other elements 
of the historical a priori operative in Germany in 1933, i.e., the ideas of 
nation, leadership, and order. The myth of German exccptionalism, and 
what Sluga calls the "German Mission," occupied the attention of both 
philosophers and politicians. Central to the myth of German exceptional ism 
were beliefs about the primordiality of the German language, the 
geographical and intellectual centrality of Germany, and the political, 
moral, and intellectual purity of the German race. Thus when Hedeigger 
spoke in his rectorial address about the unique spiritual mission of the 
German people, Sluga argues that he is not initiating a new discourse, "but 
inserting himself into one that already had a long his tory." , 7 The discursive 
framework of German exceptional ism and centrality bridge Heidegger's 
philosophy and the politics of the time. The effect of this discourse, 
however, was not an overcoming of class and race divisions but rather the 
creation of "a sharp boundary between a privileged and an underprivileged 
group." 1 8 In other words, it served to create a "binary logic" of exclusion. '9 
While we can question the justification given for claims of German 
exceptionalism, its effects are unmistakable: 
Once adopted, the discourse of identity, of folkdom, of a 
distinctive folkish mission, of the historical meaning and 
uniqueness of the nation, indeed seems inescapable, more 
so than any empirical fact could be, but it is our discourse 
that constitutes these objects and makes them inescapable. 
Once the idea grips us, a picture takes hold that we cannot 
evade—it is grounded in our discourse and that discourse 
repeats it to us inexorably. 2 0 
Belief in the centrality of the German nation is a crucial aspect of 
Heidegger's political involvement. The idea of leadership also plays a 
crucial role. Sluga argues that it was Heidegger's inability to free himself 
from the Platonic tradition, in which the well-ordered state requires 
philosophical leadership, that formed the core of his political involvement. 
Heidegger, in this respect no different from philosophers such as Fred 
Bäumler and Ernst Krieck, saw himself as the Third Reich's spiritual leader. 
, 7lbid., 120. Cf. Heidegger's Rectorial Address, "The Self-Assertion of the German 
University," in Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, 29: "The teachers and students 
who constitute the rector's following will awaken and gain strength only through 
being truly and collectively rooted in the essensc of the German university. This 
essence will attain clarity, rank, and power, however, only when the leaders are, first 
and foremost and at all times, themselves led by the inexorability of that spiritual 
mission which impresses onto the fate of the German Volk the stamp of history." 
•»Ibid., 102. 
, 9lbid., 123. 
2°Ibid., 121. 
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One implication of this line of argument is that Heidegger no longer appears 
unique in his ambition to become the philosopher of the Third Reich: 
Heidegger's political engagement thus appears as an 
attempt to secure his philosophical influence in the 
unstable conditions of the 1930's. His rectorial address 
was more than an expression of support for the Nazis; it 
was also meant to promote Heidegger's own philosophy 
and his own claims to spiritual leadership. 2 1 
Viewed in this light, Heidegger becomes simply another philosophical 
opportunist whose political engagement was determined, in part, by the 
discursive framework of leadership, and in part by self-interest. 
Sluga concludes by drawing some lessons from the political experience 
of German philosophers for contemporary philosophy. We must come to 
recognize the interdependence of philosophy and politics. Philosophy is not 
independent of politics. It exists in a political field that serves to determine 
its discourse. On the other hand, philosophy also influences the political 
realm in which ideas and words, and questions of truth and falsity are 
extremely important. Because of the constantly changing form of this 
interdependence, Sluga reaches the somewhat skeptical conclusion that 
there can be no single, decisive mela-narrative that can conclusively 
describe the relationship between philosophy and politics. The relationship 
is inherently historical "and understandable only in its narrative 
uniqueness." 2 2 
As a result, Sluga rejects the efforts of Nietzsche and Foucault to 
articulate a theory of philosophical/political interaction in terms of a general 
theory of truth and power. On Sluga's view, Nietzsche's metaphysics of the 
will to power lacks "authoritative arguments," while Foucault's theory of 
power is problematic because "[power] becomes, in his hands, a peculiar 
fluid draining invisibly through the capillaries of human society." 2 3 Sluga 
rejects these attempts to articulate a metaphysics of power: 
What we call power is, in fact, and ensemble of diverse 
relations of dependence and interdependence that include 
natural relations of cause and effect as well as social and 
political relations, relations of spatial and temporal order 
as well as institutional, logical, and symbolic relations of 
dependence. 2 4 
21 Ibid., 173. 
22|bid., 253. 
23|bid., 253. 
24|bid., 254. 
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Thus no meta-narrative of power is satisfactory as an explanation of the 
relationship of philosophy and politics: "the historical facts must speak for 
themselves."25 
There is something of a self-defeating nature in Sluga's effort to 
rclativize Heidegger's Nazi involvement. By historicizing Heidegger's 
Nazism, we learn little of Heidegger's specific motivations for joining the 
Nazi party. In particular, we learn little of what Heidegger himself saw as 
"the inner truth and greatness" of the Nazi movement, i.e., "the encounter 
between global technology and modern m a n . " 2 6 Moreover, Heidegger 
simply disappears in the course of the narrative. There is no substantial 
discussion of Heidegger until page 135, by which time one is left wondering 
if he is going to appear at all. Of course, this is the intentional result of 
Sluga's effort to de-emphasize the uniqueness of Heidegger's political 
engagement. But it is surely a problem when the nominal subject of the 
investigation is subsumed to methodological demands. 
Another problematic feature of Sluga's work is his ambivalent adoption 
of a Foucauldian hermeneutic of suspicion. The experience of Germany's 
philosophers counsels us to avoid grand, meta-narrative accounts of the 
relationship between philosophy and politics. We are cautioned not to get 
caught up in the discursive frameworks that may be operative at a given 
moment and "let the historical facts speak for themselves." But if it is the 
case, as Sluga maintains throughout this work, that discursive frameworks 
determine the realm of thought, then the facts are precisely that which 
cannot speak for themselves. There are no facts outside of discursive 
frameworks that determine what will count as a fact. In appealing to the 
facts, Sluga's argument threatens to slide into an uncritical empiricism. As a 
result, he leaves us without any substantive guidelines for recognizing 
discourses that are dangerous and for removing them from the 
philosophical/political Held. 
Sluga overlooks the fact that meta-narratives of power such as those 
found in the writings of Nietzsche and Foucault arc useful not only for their 
descriptive aspects, but also because they serve a diagnostic role. They 
allow us to recognize that formations of power arc constitutive of discursive 
frameworks. But, more importantly, they allow us to change the discursive 
framework on the basis of this recognition. For example, in On the 
Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche describes the will to power not as a 
Z5lbid., 255. 
26An Introduction to Metaphysics, 199. For a thorough discussion of this facet of 
Heidegger's Nazism see Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with 
Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1990). 
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metaphysical principle but as a "major point of historical method." 2 7 The 
point of this historical method is clearly diagnostic: 
. . . all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically 
concentrated elude definition; only that which has no 
history is definable. At an earlier stage, on the contrary, 
this synthesis of 'meanings' can still be disentangled, as 
well as changed; one can still perceive how in each 
individual case the elements of the synthesis undergo a 
shift in value and rearrange themselves accordingly, so 
that now this, now that elements comes to the fore and 
dominates at the expense of others; and under certain 
circumstances one e l e m e n t . . . appears to overcome all 
the remaining elements. 2 8 
In other words, a mela-narrative of power can be precisely the right tool to 
escape from a given historical a priori. 
Sluga's historicized account of the question of Heidegger's political 
debacle in 1933 is an extremely valuable contribution not only to the current 
debate over Heidegger's Nazism, but also to the question of philosophy's 
relation to politics. Sluga effectively dismantles the myth of Heidegger's 
political uniqueness by contcxtualizing his political involvement. Sluga's 
conclusion is therefore useful for attenuating the factional spirit of the 
contemporary debate. Heidegger's political shortsightedness can now be 
seen for what it was--the moral and intellectual failure of a large segment of 
an entire generation of German philosophers. Those who would see this as 
a victory for Heidegger arc, however, cautioned that it is a pyrrhic victory at 
best. 
2 7Fricdrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: The Modern Library, 
1968), second essay, no. 12,514. 
2 8Ibid., no. 13,516. 
